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KICKING THE EMPEROR
Some Problems of
Restoration Parallel History
David Gunto

political orientation of historical studies in sevenl^teenth-century England is axiomatic among scholars.
Particularly tendentious and polemic were studies of
English history and antiquities, 'since, as has been proven at
length, these studies often undertake to demonstrate the
limitation (or, less often, the freedom) of royal Stuart authority
as part of a political program.^ Less familiar to students of
Restoration literary culture is the similar goal of late Roman
historiography during the early 1680's. My aim in this essay
is to examine Roman historical polemics in light of the
' My discussion of seventeenth-century historiogiaphical theory and antiquities is
based upon Arthur B. Ferguson, C/io Unbound: Perception of the Social and
Cultural Past in Renaissance England (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979); F.
Smith Fussner, The Historical Revolution: English Historical Writing and Thought,
1580-1640 (New York: Coluhnbia University Press, 1962); F. J. Levy, Tudor
Historical Thought (San Marino: Himtington Library Press, 1967); J. G. A.
Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical
Thought in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1957); and R. J. Smith, The Gothic Bequest: Medieval Institutions in British Thought
1688-1863 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
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Exclusion Crisis and to discuss the peculiar combination of
insight and historical lacunae these propagandistic parallel
histories display. In challenging or defending James's right to
succeed his brother, these texts employ a remarkable medley of
arguments drawn from historical, political, moral and theologi
cal premises. The aspects of these works that address the
perceived significance of late Roman history to the immediate
problem of the Exclusion Bill bespeak an intense focus on
cultural and institutional difference as well as on purely moral
parallels, a focus that not only differentiates them from such
traditional poetic polemics as Dryden's Absalom and Achitophel,
but also denies and undercuts the very axioms of such historical
polemics. Thus, the Exclusion Crisis serves as a focal point for
a study of the confluence and conflict of two modes of
historical interpretation and poetic history, one of which is
determined by atemporal parallels of political character and
narrative, and one of which at least partially denies the
pertinence of easy parallel history in favor of a more comparativist approach to history.
Parallel histories of the Restoration have not been often
viewed in the light of Renaissance and earlier seven
teenth-century historiography, but clearly they reflect crucial
developments in these related forms. Increasingly over the
course of the seventeenth century, historical writing moved
from an essentially political genre, which focused on political
narrative and character, typified by what one scholar has called
"the tyranny of the res gestae,"^ to a mode of discourse more
accepting of and impelled by the gradually accumulating data of
social, cultural and institutional history compiled by that
industrious if eccentric group of scholars collectively referred to
as "antiquarians." Though there are exceptions to the rule, such
as Roger Ascham and Sir Thomas Elyot, Elizabethan historians
did not consider non-political material to be part of history
proper, nor did they view antiquarians as proper historians; the
^ Ferguson, ch. 1.
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duty of history as exemplified in Holinshed, Hall, and Polydore
Vergil was to detail the political fortunes of states, increasingly
with an eye to the political wisdom to be obtained thereby by
(especially) statesmen. Given the universal, static view of
human motivation and human nature common to much
Renaissance history, the "rules" recoverable through a learned
study of history were more or less universally applicable,
whether the historian's material was earlier English history or
indeed the history of another civilization.
On the other hand, the antiquarians developed through the
often erratic employment of humanist scholarship a body of
material that while not usually avowedly historical did much to
engender in English thought a sense of historical and cultural
relativity and anachronism. These studies were often compelled
by immediate political interests—church history after 1535 is a
key instance—but they were successful at creating an awareness
of "man aggregate," of how national and even local monuments,
laws, social conventions, and traditions delineate peculiarly local
and English culture. Thus, even though English legal scholars
lacked the awareness of the difference between English and
Roman law, which characterized French work in this area
(arguably due to the "lack of a basis of comparison" spoken of
by Pocock^), legal research during this period effectively
established a canon of British common law.
Had the antiquarians been more frequent or better poets, we
might expect that the emerging idea of the cultural grounding
and referentiality of historical and political narrative, if not its
complete determination by culture, could have found its way
into poetic treatments of historical parallels and problems such
as the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis. Instead, it is clear that
propaganda in prose and verse, but especially the latter,
continued the practice of historical parallels that stressed
political narrative and moral motivation or character over
impersonal social data. It has been argued persuasively that
' Pocock, ch. 3.
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verse parallels such as Absalom and Achitophel have much in
common with seventeenth-century historical writing in terms
of intention and interpretation, since they pretend to present
unbiased historical narrative for learned scrutiny."^ I would
prefer to discuss briefly another of Dryden's historical works in
this light, since the problems arising from its production shed
light on the interpretive assumptions of Restoration historical
readers with political motivations. This is Dryden's The Duke
of Guise.
An exhaustive treatment of this play and the problems its
publication created for Dryden is beyond the scope of this
essay,' but the play's introduction reveals something of how
Dryden conceived the historiographer's task and how his
enemies detected or invented treasonable intention:
Our play's a parallel: the Holy League
Begot our Cov'nant; Guisards got the Whig.
Whate'er our hot-brain'd Sheriffs did advance
Was, like our Fashions, first produc'd in France;
And, when worn out, well scourg'd, and banish'd there.
Sent over, like their godly beggars, here.
Could the same trick, twice play'd, our nation gull.^
It looks as if the Devil were grown dull;
Or serv'd us up, in scorn, his broken meat,
And thought we were not worth a better cheat. (1-10)
As soon as he announces his parallel, Dryden explains how
the French Holy League "begot" the English Solemn League
•* John M. Wallace, "Dryden and History: A Problem in Allegorical Reading,"
ELH 36 (1969): 265-91.
' A useful and pentrating discussion of the interpretive complexities surrounding
the play, the production of which was actually delayed for a time because of
historcal inferences, is Alan Roper, "Drawing Parallels and Making Applications
in Restoration Literature," in Politics as Reflected in Literature: Papers Presented at
a Clark Library Seminar, 17 January 1987 (Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1989).
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and Covenant, and it becomes clear immediately that the
parallel depends not on how these respective bodies operate
within a nexus of political, social and legal entities unique to
their respective states but upon their both having been, like all
rebellion, instigated by the Devil, who lacks the invention to
create an entirely new plan of treason for the English. Indeed,
this is the type of parallel historiography central to Dryden
and to much verse polemic. Its predominance cannot be due
simply to its relative ease (the sin with which Johnson and
Coleridge charged classical parallels), but must be explained as
being largely the result of the period's exclusion of non-moral
and non-political elements from much of its official history.
Again, the Whig attacks on Dryden's play assume only parallels
of character and plot. The key question became whether
Dryden intended only a parallel of "times" or one of "men" as
well. The Whigs argued the latter, of course, so that Dryden
could be shown to have made comparisons between Charles n
and the morally problematic Henry HI, but both times and men
are seen to be parallel because the respective political narratives
and (more controversially in this case) the moral characters of
the key players are implicated in Dryden's choice of stories.
Had Dryden been more thoroughly antiquarian in his thinking
(as was, for instance, his Royal Society friend and colleague
Walter Charleton), he might well have replied that the French
Holy League and Henry were the product of Gallic culture and
history and therefore simply could not be exported to England,
but in this case the moral dimension of the play and conse
quently its purpose would be lost. This is why, as Alan Roper
has argued. Restoration parallel histories tend to exclude
differences in detail and narrative and to emphasize and distort
resemblances.^
Viewed in the light of "antiquarian" historiography, the
traditional historical parallels of the Restoration are clearly, as
in the case of Dryden, heavily indebted to the ahistorical
' Roper, Politics.
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modalities of Biblical typological interpretation, even when the
subject is classical rather than scriptural. Of course, Dryden's
main excursion into polemic, typological history, Absalom and
Achitophel, takes Old Testament narrative as its theological
justification; the privileged history of the Bible underwrites, as
it were, the validity of Dryden's politicized narrative. But
while this mode provides supernatural sanction for its view of
history, its essential ahistoricity is obvious when viewed in the
light of the propagandistic prose histories composed by some of
Dryden's contemporaries.
A convenient example is Dryden's rather casual use of
parallel institutions in the poem. Consider the following
passage from Achitophel's temptation address to Absalom:
Let him give on till he can give no more.
The thrifty Sanhedrin shall keep him poor;
And every shekel which he can receive.
Shall cost a limb of his prerogative. (390-93)
Within the context of the poem this passage is an obvious
allusion to the Whig strategy of coercing Charles by witholding
money in Parliament, a time-honored maneuver. But from a
wider perspective this brief mention of the Sanhedrin, a central
institution in biblical Hebrew culture, is highly problematic.
Does Dryden mean to suggest that the historical Sanhedrin had
the power of the purse over Saul or David? Or, to put it a bit
more bluntly, are we as sympathetic readers of the poem
expected to believe that the Sanhedrin is somehow really "like"
the British Parliament? Clearly the question is irrelevant. The
purpose of the Sanhedrin in the poem is merely to serve as a
morally questionable political body that can be manipulated by
wicked men. Its actual, historical resemblance to what is in fact
a radically different English institution is not a matter Dryden
expects his readers to consider; the moral resemblance is
enough. In a different more antiquarian political text this
question might, we may easily imagine, be paramount to some
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key political point. Is it relevant to make this comparison, for
instance, when the roles and prerogatives of these respective
bodies are so radically different? Perhaps even the use of
"shekels" for "pounds" reveals a crucial difference in economic
arrangements which the historian would be well advised to
consider in his polemic.
The conception of history as depending on timeless patterns
of ethical motivation and divinely distributed justice is still
potent in the texts I wish to examine. Indeed, the typological
idea of history outlined above is alive and well in Exclusion
debate, prose and verse; and in even those texts concerned with
antiquarian interpretations, the influence of the Biblical model,
of type and antitype, shadow and fulfillment (or event and
replay), motivates the choice of historical analogues. Even a
character from secular rather than sacred history can be
expected to prefigure the fate, good or bad, of his English
counterpart, since classical figures are subject to the same
passions, excite the same responses in their countrymen, and
provoke God in more or less the same ways.
The prose polemics inspired by the Exclusion Crisis
incorporate both strands of seventeenth-century historical
thought.
At times they extend the naive assumptions
concerning the continunity and uniformity of English social
life, especially English law, to their treatment of Roman
history, while alternately they reject the exclusively political
and narrative focus of the versifying historians in order to
demonstrate the essential incompatibility of the parallels
themselves.
The first Roman history in this controversy is the Reverend
Samuel Johnson's Life of Julian the Apostate.^ Published
around 18 June 1682, the work is a response to a sermon
preached by George Hickes (who will figure prominently
shortly) which extolled the sovereign power of kings and
^ Works of the Late Samuel Johnson, sometime Chaplain to the Right Honourable
William Lord Russell (London, 1710).
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passive obedience to them. Chaplain to Lord Russell, who
brought the Bill of Exclusion before Parliament, Johnson was
notorious to his contemporaries as a zealous defender of
Protestantism and "liberty" against the encroachments of Stuart
prerogative and Catholic interest. Predictably, Johnson found
himself in legal trouble upon more than one occasion, but he
was never closer to the center of controversy than he was upon
the appearance of Julian. This small book, intended to
champion the cause of the Whig exclusionists, draws a sustained
parallel between the careers and characters of James 11 and
Julian the Apostate.
The importance of the controversy between Johnson and
Hickes (as well as other minor figures on the Royalist side) lies
in the fact that this debate, in its deployment of "antiquarian"
data and in its ultimately skeptical interrogation of the classical
parallel's central historiographical assumptions, prefigures the
final defeat of this mode of historical polemic by argument
from linguistic, institutional and sociological inquiry. For
instance, the concerted scholarly efforts of Robert Brady and his
followers, sympathetic all of them to the Tory/Stuart cause,
produced during and after the period of the Exclusion Crisis a
body of scholarship on English history that, drawing on
primarily non-narrative material, destroyed more or less
completely the Whig notion of an ancient, Gothic constitution
that gave supremacy to the Parliament over the Crown. The
Johnson/Hickes exchange represents a first, tentative step of the
"new" history into the realm of the historical parallel, an early
intrusion of empirical and comparative historical analysis into
the essentially poetic, analogical and moral realm of the parallel
character. The ui^ency of the Exclusion to the readers of these
works and the prestige of the disputants (the chaplain to a
notorious Whig peer and a renowned Jacobite linguistic scholar
respectively) only underscore the importance of the battle's
central issue: whether the poetic analysis of politics and
character undertaken by Dryden and the others is ultimately a
valid historical hermeneutic. In the long run, over the ensuing
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decades, the answer to the question posed early by Johnson and
Hickes is no.
The long-term development is incidental to Johnson's
immediate aims, of course. The immediate point of his
comparison is obvious. James, like Julian, brings an "alien"
religion to the throne and is likely to repeat Julian's pagan
persecution of "true" Christians (indeed, the book goes so far as
to include "A Comparison of Popery and Paganism"). But
Johnson's appropriation of fourth-century Roman history is
designed to do more than merely villify James. Johnson
employs a sophisticated legal and political parallel to attack the
central doctrine of Stuart royalists: the theological imperative
of passive obedience. Thus, Johnson employs both an
ahistorical moral parallel as well as a comparative study of
sovereignty and succession to attack James and to undercut the
theoretical premises of his supporters.
Johnson's preface dwells at some length upon the question
of the legal status of Christianity at different historical periods,
a concept central to his attack on the theory of passive
obedience and to his claim that the early church would have
favored England's exclusion of an anti-Christian monarch:
This Behaviour of theirs Qulian's Christian subjects]
being so contrary to what is commonly reported of them,
and to the Carriage of former Christians, I found it
necessary to make some few Remarks upon it; and to
show that there was as wide a difference betwixt their
Case, and that of the first Christians, as Laws for Men,
and against Men, could possibly make. (4)
This feature of Johnson's attack on passive obedience turns
the table on the theoretical defenders of that doctrine;
Johnson admits the Pauline injunction to submit to the
ordinances of men, but he insists on the illegal status of early
Christianity. By Julian's time, Johnson explains, Christianity
was the established, legal religion, so that threats to it could be
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resisted actively in good conscience. Johnson adduces St. Paul's
defense of himself under Roman law to prove that the Apostle
was not in favor of passive obedience:
And St. Paul himself was not for Passive obedience by
any means, even when the lawful Magistrate persecuted
him, if it were in an unlawful way; but he stood upon
his Birthright. For did he not in one place awe the
Centurion and chief Captain, and make all the Soldiers
vanish who were commanded to beat him, by telling
them he was a Roman? (6)
Johnson's problem as a theoretical exclusionist, a problem
reflected in his Roman parallel history, is that he must do more
through his comparison than merely make James odious as a
man. His historiography is obliged to draw sufficient institu
tional and legal parallels to compel his English audience to
admit resistance to a legal monarch on religious grounds.
Johnson's use of St. Paul's appeal to Roman law is useful, but
his establishment of Julian as a legal or constitutional monarch
in the English tradition is perhaps the weakest part of his
polemic. He is obliged, in the second chapter of Julian, "The
Sense of the Primitive Christians about his [Julian's] Succes
sion," to insist on the legal and (more important) entailed
nature of Julian's accession. That is, Johnson must maintain
that a legal monarch may be resisted for opposing an established
religion, and that the regret he perceives in the church fathers'
discussion of Julian ai^es that the Church would have opposed
Julian's coming to the throne had they known of his religion.
Johnson quotes Eusebius and Eumenius to support his
contention that the Roman Empire was hereditary. In the
absence of documentary evidence of resistance to Julian during
his lifetime (a thorny problem for Johnson), he cites the
invective of St. Gregory. The problem posed by the relative
passivity of the fathers and of the army with regard to Julian
are explicitly addressed by Johnson in a rare instance of
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apparent lack of confidence in the historical solidity of an
assertion:
They [the church fathers] were not so happy indeed as to
be beforehand with Julian, and to get him excluded;
because, as I said before, there was not the least suspicion
that he had chang'd his Religion: but they shew'd him
their good will sufficiently by what they said and did
afterward. If they had no occasion to make their Applica
tion to Constantius about this Business while he was here,
will it not do full as well, if they call after him to Hea
ven, and expostulate the Matter with him there.^ (12)
Johnson's invocation of Gregory is problematic, as responses
to Julian realized, especially in light of the paucity of real
opposition to Julian. The text skirts the problem by dismissing
the historical lack of active rebellion as a result of weakness and
by insisting, throughout the remainder of the book, that the
challenging and rude behavior directed by isolated Christians at
Julian bespeaks a legal Roman resistance to an unlawful,
unchristian despot and his religion. Johnson divides these
resistances into three main categories: the "words" "actions"
and "devotions" of Julian's Christian subjects. The first of these
examples is largely anecdotal and consists of collected verbal
attacks on Julian. Most of these are the actions of individuals,
such as the nobleman of Berea, who denounced paganism in the
presence of Julian, although the Antiochans are recorded as a
group as having "abominated" Julian, for which they were
named "beard haters" by the Emperor.
Johnson provides two examples of actions taken against
Julian, one of which is Gregory Nazianzen's claim that his
father threatened to kick the Emperor for bringing archers
against the temple. The narrative section of Johnson's book
then closes with accounts of the harsh invectives the Christians
composed after the death of Julian, their prayers against his
paganism, and (most provocatively) an account of Julian's death.
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Johnson quotes Libanius in perhaps the most provocative
passage in his book;
For it is not improbable, that some one of the Soldiers
might take into consideration, how the Heathens, and all
Men to this day, do still praise those who long since
have kill'd Tyrants, as Men that were willing to die for
the common Liberty, and defended in that manner their
Countrymen, Kinsmen, and Friends. (25)
Here Johnson develops his parallel to a dangerous extreme;
perhaps it is not surprising that he was flogged in 1686 for
inciting the army to rebellion. Likewise in his chapter
"Reflections on the Behaviour of these Christians," Johnson
returns to his main theme, the essential difference between the
first-century legal status of Christianity and its position as the
official creed of Julian's empire and Charles U's England.
Johnson also cites Bracton to support the priority of the law
over the will of a "popish successor," whose will can have no
binding legal authority if manifested in an illegal act. Johnson's
use of English legal history is, it seems to me, the most
persuasive element of his polemic, but the cultural and
institutional differences between Rome and England form the
basis of some of the most potent responses to Julian, two of
which I would like to examine here.'
' I have chosen these for their representative arguments and because they
occasioned rephes from Johnson. Other pubhshed responses include Edward
Meredith's Some remarks upon a late popular piece of nonsense called Julian the
Apostate, (1682), Thomas Lang's Vindication of the Primitive Christians (1683), and
John Northleigh's The Triumph of our Monarchy (1685). There is also Dryden and
Tate's Absalom and Achitophel part 2, which, ironically, ridiculed Johnson in a
pseudo-bibhcal parallel as "Ben-Jochanan." Dryden would have been famihar with
Johnson, of course; he contributed commendatory verses to Northleigh's The
Iriuimph of our Monarchy, which contains "observations" on Julian. In 1695
Charles Hatton noted that "Juhan Johnson" continued in his insistence on the
power of the people over the monarch. See Poems of John Dryden, vol. IV, ed.
James Kinsley (Oxford: Clarendon University Press, 1958), 1925.
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The first of these, John Bennett's Constantius the Apostate,
does not effectively exploit this weakness.' Bennett's method
is rather to follow the biographical method of Julian in order
to prove that Constantius, who became an Arian before leaving
the throne to Julian, provides a truer parallel to the English
situation (though as a royalist piece Constantius does not draw
comparisons between the heretical emperor and the Prince of
York). Bennett's chapter-by-chapter parallel is lai^ely a
refutation of Johnson's treatment of his historical sources, a
theme of much anti-Julian polemic. In refuting Johnson's
discussion of the Christians' "actions" and "Devotions, Psalms,
and Prayers," for instance, Bennett attempts to overwhelm
Julian with the volume of counter-examples he can cite. He
ai^ues that, taken in context and as a whole, both the outward
submission of Christians, including the army, and their prayers
bespeak clearly their acceptance of the Arian Constantius as a
legal ruler. The few contrary examples are for Bennett
exceptional instances of un-Christian behavior on the part of
isolated individuals. Constantius was recognized as legitimate
despite his religion.
Apart from the standard biblical defenses of passive
obedience, only two features of Bennett's apology are notable
here. The first of these is his acceptance of Johnson's view of
Roman succession as hereditary; this historical lapse he uses to
his advantage by claiming that, if Johnson's citation is correct
and the crown was passed on by a "law of nature," exclusion
would be contrary to that natural law. The second, and more
historically perceptive of Bennett's arguments concerning law
is that Johnson's distinction between first-century Christians
and those under Constantius is false, since the notion of a law
standing apart from and having priority over the emperor's will
is a misapprehension of history. He observes, in the most terse
statement of this problem;

' John Bennet, Constantius the Apostate (London, 1683).
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The Laws were no more against the first Christians, than
they were against those under Julian: for they suffered
both by the same Law, viz the uncontrollable will of
their Emperour. (59)
It is interesting that although Bennett addresses Johnson's
legal arguments, especially those from Bracton, he fails to
exploit the difference between Roman and English institutions,
even though this difference is implicit in both authors'
discussion of English law. The tendency to emphasize a
universal morality of character and action over governmental
and social differences is at times even more powerful in Bennett
than in Johnson, and it remained for a more learned and
lengthier royalist response to Julian to take advantage of this
fundamental weakness of Johnson's argument.
This was Geoi^e Hickes's Jovian, or an Answer to Julian the
Apostate, published in 1683.'° Hickes was a learned and prolific
(and Jacobite) divine, who has been called the "most important
single figure among the historical scholars of England in the
latter half of the seventeenth century."" Hickes's later work
involved Anglo-Saxon linguistic scholarship, and provided an
immense foundation of data on Anglo-Saxon social life and
customs on which subsequent historical scholarship could build,
though significantly Hickes did not call his work "history."
Hickes's scholarly interest dovetailed naturally in his refutation
of Johnson. Hickes's book, like Bennett's, presents a reexami
nation of Johnson's sources and reiterates Bennett's assertion
that the subjects of Julian were generally notable for the
obedience and acceptance they granted their emperor. But
[George Hickes], Jovian, or an Answer to Julian the Apostate, 2nd ed. (London,
1683).
" David C. Douglas, English Scholars (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939), 93. A more
recent and penetrating view of Hickes's role in antiquarianism, especially the
Ancient and Modems controveny, is Joseph M. Levine, Battle of the Books:
Literature and History in the Augustan Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991),
chs. 11, 12.
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Hickes goes much further; there is, for instance, an attack on
Johnson's use of the Julian narrative as a parallel. Having
pointed out the impossibility of the Romans considering
provisional or exclusionary laws against an unpopular successor,
Hickes demonstrates the many historical gaps in Johnson's
parallel:
And truly, to make the case of Julian, and his R. H.
exactly parallel, we must not only suppose, that the
Succession to the Empire was Hereditary, but that
Constantin the Great had been murdered after a long
Rebellion by the Aerians, his Son Constantius miracu
lously preserved and restored and the Ruined Church
restored with him; that from the time of his Restauration, the Aerians resumed their old practices against the
Church and the Monarchy, and underhand helped Juliany
after he had left the Communion of the Church, to get an
Indulgence for themselves and the Pagans;...and that
however the Aerians and Pagans were opposite in other
things, yet they agreed in conspiring against the Estab
lished Christian Religion, even in the Senate, where they
always voted alike. (80)
Here Hickes both exposes the many points at which the two
narratives differ fundamentally and employs the parallel to
castigate Johnson and the Whig opposition by associating them
with the Arians and pagans, an association that calls into
question both their religious orthodoxy and their civic loyalty.
Hickes's sense of the basic differences between Roman and
English institutions, of the historical developments (including
linguistic change) by which cultural mechanisms assume
legitimacy and meaning, is perhaps the most potent apologetic
element in Hickes's work. Throughout, Hickes insists not only
on the inaccuracy of Johnson's Creek or on his partial use of
sources, but on the gaping holes in historical understanding
Johnson exhibits. The first chapter of Jovian is called "The
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Roman Empire not Hereditary," and its ailment attacks,
through a brief but compelling account of the emperors up to
Julian, one of Johnson's crucial premises: that the Romans of
the fourth century resisted a legal, hereditary monarch. The
Preface of the book makes the same point in comparative terms
and demonstrates a sophisticated awareness of the linguistic
element of historical argument:
First, then, whereas I have asserted. That there was no
such thing as Entail, nor any Notion of it among the
Romans, I think it necessary here to add. That this limited
way of Hereditary Succession unto one Line is grounded
wholly upon the Feudal Laws, which had nothing
common at all with the old Roman or Civil Laws, but
were received from the Customs of the Barbarous
Nations, which invaded the Empire, and after settled in
it. (6-7)
They [the Romans] were probably as Ignorant of these
sorts of Settlements, and Heirships, as their Subjects:
which is worth observing to all those, who read the Latin
or Greek authors, that they be not imposed upon by the
words Heir, Hereditary, Inheritance, or Patrimony ,which
never signifie in that special manner, as they do among us
in relation to that unalienable sort of Lineal Succession,
which is common to Entailed Estates, and Hereditary
Kingdoms from the beginning. (11)
Hickes thus identifies a central weakness in Johnson's
position: the conflation of two widely different socio-political
contexts in order to justify English resistance by analogy of
Roman rebellion. That is, if Roman emperors were established
not by patrimony as a legal institution but rather by the
pleasure of emperors (which is Hickes's interpretation of
Eusebius's "law of nature" in his discussion of Julian's
succession), then there is no appeal to common law existing

Kicking the Emperor

125

prior to and above the will of an emperor to justify either
exclusion or active resistance. The second half of this equation
is perhaps implicit in Bennett, but Hickes examines the problem
of the theory of succession more fully than any other historian
involved in this controversy.
Hickes also manages to catch Johnson in a source problem
involving the question of inheritance. This is Johnson's use of
Eusebius. Hickes begins with Johnson's citation of that author:
Constantin the Great (saith he) Famous for being the
first Christian Emperour, divided the whole Empire at his
death amongst his three Sons, as a Father doth his Estate
among his Children...This indeed sounds somewhat like
an Entailed Inheritance, whereas, had he truly and entirely
rendred the place, it would not have Favoured that
Design; for Eusebius saith That Constantin...dlwided the
whole Empire, like a Patrimony amongst his three Sons,
as being the most Beloved of his Heirs. (94-5)
That is, Hickes contends that Eusebius claims that
Constantine chose his sons to inherit the Empire from among
a group of heirs, and "might have passed by his Sons, and given
the Empire to them." Hickes also reiterates Bennett's attack on
the distinction in Johnson between the legal status of first and
fourth-century Christianity. Hickes repeats the familiar
argument that neither the Neronian nor the Constantian/Julian
persecution was illegal since, statutes legalizing Christianity
notwithstanding, the will of the emperors was a law unto itself.
Hickes appeals to Fortesque to begin his discussion (whose
authority Johnson effectively addresses in his response to
Jovian), but soon proceeds to classical sources, citing Dio to
make the nature of Roman law clear on this point:
This is the Sum of what Dio saith of the Imperial
Leviathan, to which the Civil Law agrees; which tells us.
That "the Emperor was above Law, that whatsoever
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pleased him had the nature of a Law, because by the Lex
Regia, the People had surrendered unto him all their
Authority, and Power: whatsoever therefore the Emperor
appointed by Letters, or knowingly decreed, or declared
in his Interlocutors, or commanded by an Edict, was a
Law." (87)
Hickes proceeds to show how this "Legal Absolute Power"
was manifested over a wide range of imperial actions, including
not only the selection of heirs, to which he devotes his first
chapter, but also the execution of members of the imperial
household. Thus everything suffered by both early and
fourth-century Christians was according to law, to which true
Christians must submit. Here Hickes implies the legal position
he later announces: that while no subject may be impelled to
believe or act contrary to his faith, he may not resist even the
persecutions of a lawful monarch, since a lawful sovereign's
statutes are law and since Scripture demands obedience to the
ordinances of men.
Johnson's published responses to these attacks (published
together in his Collected Works of 1710) are a curious mixture
of insight and historical blind spots. His task in the "Answer
to Constantius the Apostate" is generally simple; most of the
tract points to partial rendering of Bennett's sources, which if
fully translated show that Constantius, though flawed, was
neither wicked nor apostate. Johnson also insists upon his
distinction between submission to legal ordinances and to those
enacted contrary to law.
The "Answer to Jovian" is more problematic and displays
some of the tensions between versions of historical interpreta
tion we have seen already. To refute Hickes's rather solid
assault on his ahistorical notion of an hereditary empire,
Johnson can do comparatively little. He is forced to search his
sources more carefully to discover a pattern of blood relation
ships between emperors and their successors, but his response
is not really up to the challenge.
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On the other hand, Johnson's critique of Hickes's deploy
ment of English legal scholarship, especially Fortesque, is much
more effective. Johnson succeeds in exposing Hickes's fine
distinction between royal prerogative and common law, a
common law that, Johnson believes, is in no way violated by
an act of exclusion. Johnson's careful legal reasoning goes far
toward establishing a legal foundation, derived from English
common law, for passing an act of exclusion that respects the
royal prerogative and the hereditary nature of the monarchy.
And this perhaps is the greatest irony of this pamphlet battle,
since for Johnson the most potent aspect of his argument is
not his historical parallel but his discussion of radically different
English institutions; the analogy between Roman and English
history is effectively discredited by Hickes, who nevertheless
uses the parallel to at^ue against exclusion. This passionate
searching for parallels amid a largely institutionally irrelevant
antiquity is, aside from moral and theological applications, an
irony perhaps most akin to that implicit irony in the career of
that greatest of Jacobite historians of English antiquity. Dr.
Robert Brady, who destroyed the notion of a whiggish "Saxon"
past only to be posthumously mined and pillaged by exponents
of "progressive" Whig historiography.*^ In both cases the
alienness of the past is both an opportunity for historical
understanding and a potential epistemological explosive in the
midst of polemic, historical projects.
Isaac Knunnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Potties of Nostalgui in the Age
of Walpole (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), ch. 5.

